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COUNSEL FEES AND OTHER EXPENSES OF
LITIGATION AS AN ELEMENT OF DAMAGESt
By CHARLES T. McCoRM[ICK*
1. HISTORY AND SCOPE OF CosTs AWARDED AT Co ImoN LAW.
A CCORDING to Pollock and Maitland it is probable that before
the time of Edward I, in many actions for damages, "a
successful plaintiff might often under the name of 'damages' ob-
tain a compensation which would cover the costs of litigation as
well as all other harm that he had sustained."' This rule allowing
plaintiff his "costs" was broadened in 1275 by the Statute of
Gloucester to cover also actions for the recovery of land, then
an all-important type of litigation. A series of statutes, begin-
ning in the reign of Henry VIII and ending in that of Anne,2
extended finally the same advantage to successful defendants.
Thus, in the common law courts, the rule became established
in England long before the American Revolution that except in
some cases where the plaintiff recovers only trivial damages, the
party who wins a law suit is entitled to recover from the losing
adversary the "costs" of the litigation.
These "costs" under the English system included not merely
the fees which the party has had to pay to the officers of the court
at the different stages of the litigation, but likewise the fees
*Dean of the University of North Carolina School of Law, Chapel
Hill, North Carolina.
tThis article will form the basis of a chapter in an elementary text-
book on Damages, which will be published by the West Publishing"
Company, St. Paul, Minn.
12 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2nd ed., 597,
quoted in an illuminating recent article by Professor A. L. Goodhart,
Costs (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 849 (describes the English system of costs
and compares it with the American).
2 See 3 Blackstone Commentaries 400.
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which he has had to pay to his own lawyers,3 both attorney or
solicitor ano counsel or barrister, 4 within certain limits. "Costs"
also included certain other expenses of preparing his case for
trial. This extensive indemnity for counsel fees and other ex-
penses as "costs" continues to-day in England under the practice
instituted by the Judiciary Act of 1875, but it is governed by
rules of court and not by statute, and instead of the automatic al-
lowance of costs to the prevailing party the awarding of costs
is within the discretion of the court.5
The English system of costs, in its general outline, seems to
have been transplanted in this country before the Revolution and
the classical English rules by which costs are awarded in actions
at law to the successful party except in trivial recoveries remains
the usual rule in most of the states today. It was, however,
apparently customary in each state to incorporate in the local
statutes detailed provisions setfing out the allowable charges for
attorney's and counsel fees and the other items of expense for
which recovery was given under the head of costs. However, the
attorney's fees which were thus prescribed were rigidly limited
in amount though, under the conditions then obtaining, doubtless
they were a substantial contribution toward the fees actually paid
by the client. In Virginia, for example, it was enacted that in
county court actions there should be taxed as costs an attorney's
fee of "fifteen shillings or one hundred and fifty pounds of
tobacco." 6  But the principle of full compensation for expenses
of litigation never became fully a part of the American tradition,
for these statutes fixing the scale of taxable attorneys' fees have
nowhere in this country been revised to keep pace with the fall
in the value of money.7 Consequently, we find to-day that where
sGoodhart, Costs, (1929) 38 -Yale L. J. 849, 856-59. A detailed
description of the items allowed at the present time is given in The
Annual Practice, 1930, appendix, note 1742 et seq.
4The attorneys or solicitors deal directly with the client and handle
all his legal business except that in the superior courts. The actual
trial of cases is conducted by barristers or counsel who also may be
consulted by the solicitors for opinions on difficult matters of law and
may be called in to advise in the drafting of important documents.
Goodhart, Costs, (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 849, 856. n. 38.5Order lxv, r. I, The Annual Practice, 1930, 1337; Goodhart, Costs,(1929) 38 Yale L. J. 849, note 4, 860.
0Virginia, Laws Feb. 1745, ch. 6, sec. 14, 5 Henning, Stat. at L. 344.
7The evaluation of the fee-bill in South Carolina, as an example,
may be traced by examining the Acts of 1694, 2 Cooper, Stat. at L. 86,
92; 1736, 3 Cooper, Stat. at L. 418; 1791, 5 Cooper, Stat. at L. 154;
and 1827, 6 Cooper, Stat. at L. 332. In the earliest statute, the plain-
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attorneys' fees are included at all in the regular taxable costs, the
sums allowed are merely nominal and wholly inadequate to com-
pensate the cofinsel to whom they are allowed and whose charges
therefore must be almost entirely borne from the pocket of the
party employing him. For example, in the federal courts, a
docket fee of twenty dollars is allowed as costs to the attorney for
the prevailing party," and in Pennsylvania for the prosecution of
a suit to judgment an attorney's fee of three dollars is awarded. 9
In New Hampshire, counsel fees may be taxed in the sum of one
dollar.'0
The form of indemnity for this expense is thus retained in
some states but the reality has vanished, for the doctrine is
firmly established in this country that taxable costs are the out-
side limit of indemnity for expenses of the present litigation.
2. RECOVERY or ATTORNEY'S FEES AND OTHER EXPENSES OF
LITIGATION DENIED IN ACTIONS AT LAW.
We shall see that sometimes actual expenses including counsel
fees, in addition to the costs taxed by the court, of another
previons litigation may be recovered."- The rule, however, is
universal in this country that in actions for debt or damages, or
for the recovery of land or chattels, i.e. actions which under the
older system would have been at law rather than in equity, ad-
miralty, or probate, the successful party cannot recover counsel
fees, expenses of witnesses, travel cost, or any other outlay in-
cident to preparing and trying his case, except to the limited ex-
tiff's attorney received sixteen shillings for his services up to and in-
cluding the filing of the declaration, and under the latest the corres-
ponding fees amounted to eight dollars. The Virginia fifteen shilling
statute of 1745, 5 Henning, Stat. at L. 344 was still followed in Ken-
tucky seventy-five years later, see Rankin v. McDowell, (1820) 2 A. K.
Marsh (Ky.) 621.
828 U.S.C.A. sec. 572, Mason's U. S. Code tit. 28, sec. 572. This
provision has remained practically unchanged since 1853 (Act of Feb.
26, 1853, ch. lxxx, 10 Stat. at L. 161). In 1793 the Congress had fixed
the scale of compensation for parties' "travel and attendance, and for
attorneys' and counsellors' fees," except in admiralty, at the sums
allowed in the courts of the respective states, Act of March 1, 1793 ch.
xx, 1 Stat. at L. 333. The act was temporary and whether it was
later made permanent is doubtful. Its subsequent history is recounted
in Hathaway v. Roach, (1846) 2 Woodb. & M. 63, 11 Fed. Cas. No.
6213.
9 Pennsylvania, Statutes, West 1920, sec. 10702, originally enacted in
1821.
10jaques v. Manchester Coal & Ice Co., (1916) 78 N. H. 248, 100
Atl. 47.
"See secs. 7-10, post, pages 630-636.
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tent that these items are included, under statutory authorization,
in the taxable costs, 12 or are specifically made recoverable by
statute in special types of cases,'5 or are recoverable by virtue
of a contract by a party to pay them.' 4
Attorney's fees and other legal expenses may be considered in
measuring exemplary damages in some states,' 5 and thus indirectly
enter into the jury's award, but it is not even in such cases re-
covered as an item of compensation to which the plaintiff is en-
titled.
3. THE ALLOWANCE OF COUNSEL FEES AND OTHER EXPENSES
FROM A COMMON FUND
The earlier sections of this article have dealt with the extent
to which the common law courts will give an award of expenses
of litigation against an adversary merely because he has resisted
a proper claim or has prosecuted an improper one. To be dis-
tinguished from these cases are cases which involve a different
situation not ordinarily presented in the simple contentious litiga-
tion typical of the common law courts. Under the English system,
where a fund or estate needed to be distributed among a number
12Denying counsel fees: 0. S. Stanley Co. v. Rogers, (1923) 25
Ariz. 308, 216 Pac. 1072; St. Peter's Church v. Beach, 1857) 26 Conn.
355; United Power Co. v. Matheny, (1909) 81 Ohio St. 204, 90 N. E. 154,
28 L. R. A. (N.S.) 761; Corinth Bank & Trust Co. v. Security N. Bank,
(1923) 148 Tenn. 136, 252 S. W. 1001; see Decennial Digests, Costs,
Key No. 172, and Damages, Key Nos. 71 and 72.
Denying other dxpenses: Parke v. McDaniels, (1865) 37 Vt. 594;
Good v. Mylin, (1848) 8 Pa. St. 51, 49 Am. Dec. 493; Boardman v.
Marshalltown Gro. Co., (1898) 105 Iowa 445, 75 N. W. 343.
1'See, post, sec. 6, pages 626-630.
14The most common example of such contracts is the attorney's
fee clause customarily included in promissory notes in some states
whereby the maker promises to pay an attorney's fee in case the note
on default is placed in an attorney's hands. Occasionally a similar
promise is inserted in other types of contracts. In most states such
contracts are held valid if not so excessive as to be penal. Vingard
v. Republic'Iron & Steel Co.. (1921) 205 Ala. 269, 87 So. 552; McClain v.
Continental Supply Co., (1917) 66 Okla. 225, 168 Pac. 815; Colley
v. Summers Parrott Hardware Co., (1916) 119 Va. 439, 89 S. E. 906,
Ann. Cas. 1917D 375. A minority of jurisdictions, however, regard
them as penal and invalid regardless of reasonableness. Security
Finance Co. v. Hendry, (1925) 189 N. C. 549, 127 S. E. 629; Ralston v.
Stone, (1925) 113 Or. 506, 232 Pac. 631; First N. Bank of Pineville v.
Sanders, (1916) 77 W. Va. 716, 88 S. E. 187. See Decennial Digests,
Bills and Notes, Key No. 110, and 2 Williston, Contracts 786.
15 Marshall v. Bitner, (1850) 17 Ala. 832; Craney v. Donovan, (1917)
92 Conn. 236, 102 Atl. 640; Titus v. Corkins, (1879) 21 Kan. 722. See
the present writer's article on "Some Phases of the Doctrine of Ex-
emplary Damages," (1930) 8 N. C. L. Rev. 129, 148.
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of claimants-who might be disputing among themselves but
might also have a common interest in protecting the fund against
outsiders-such a situation was usually dealt with by tribunals
other than common law courts. Among the principal judicial
agencies to whom this function of distributing or administering
such funds was delegated were courts of equity, courts having
probate jurisdiction, and courts of bankruptcy. Despite the
modern amalgamation of courts, the distinctions in procedure be-
tween the simple common law types of litigation (chiefly actions
for damages and for the recovery of specific property) and the
functions which are distributive in the sense above indicated
still remain. In such distributive proceedings it frequently hap-
pens that some party to the proceedings (usually himself one of
the claimants to a share in the fund or estate) is especially active
in bringing into the hands of the court for administration the
entire estate, or in increasing the estate by establishing claims to
additional money or property, or in protecting the estate from the
claims of outsiders, or in defeating unfounded or excessive claims
of particular distributees. In all types of such administrative pro-
ceedings the principle is well established that where one of the
parties has thus by active litigation created, increased or protectecj
a common fund which is in the hands of the court for distribution
and which other claimants will share, such party is equitably en-
titled to be reimbursed out of the fund itself for his reasonable
counsel fees and other expenses.", Obviously, also, similiar rea-
"'A leading case is Internal Improvement Fund v. Greenaugh,
(1881) 105 U. S. 527, 26 L. Ed. 1157. In that case the title to several
millions of acres of Florida land was vested in trustees to secure the
payment of the bonds of a railway company. Vose, one of the bond-
holders, on behalf of all the bond-holders, brought a suit in which he
alleged that the trustees had fraudulently disposed of a large part of
the land at nominal prices and in which he sought and secured the
setting aside of some of the fraudulent conveyances, and the removal
of the trustees and the administration of the property by the court so
as to realize a substantial sum of money for the bond-holders. On
appeal the court approved the allowance from the fund to Vose of his
counsel fees and certain expenditures incurred in the prosecution of
the suit amounting to about $55,000, and said, "It would be very hard on
him to turn him away without any allowance except the paltry sum
which could be taxed under the fee-bill. It would not only be unjust
to him, but it would give to the other parties entitled to participate
in the benefits of he fund an unfair advantage. He has worked for
them as well as for himself; and if he cannot be reimbursed out of the
fund itself, they ought to contribute their due proportion of the ex-
penses which he has fairly incurred. To make them a charge upon
the fund is the most equitable way of securing such contribution."
In Drain v. Wilson, (1921) 117 Wash. 34, 200 Pac. 581, the plain-
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sonable expenses of the officer of the court who administers the
fund, such as a receiver in equity,1" trustee in bankruptcy,' or
executor or administrator, 9 will likewise be allowed from the
funds. This applies also to the mere custodian or possessor, not
judicially appointed, who is forced to litigate to protect the fund
or property, such as a pledgee,' 0 garnishee, -". or one who by in-




4. MAY A COURT OF EQUITY ALLOW COUNSEL FEES AND EX-
PENSES AGAINST ONE WHO ASSERTS A GROUNDLESS CLAIM OR
DEFENCE?
The allowance of expenses of litigation out of a common fund
as a recompense for protecting the fund has habituated the courts
of equity to the practice of awarding counsel fees and similar out-
lays, and it might have been expected that in this country in
equity suits the English practice of making such allowance to the
successful party, regardless of the existence of a fund, in the
tiffs were four of the heirs at law of a decedent who had previously
instituted proceedings against the administrator to compel him to
account for certain moneys owed by him to the decedent as part of
the estate. This suit was successful, but the later discovery of a will
disclosed that only two of the plaintiffs had any interest in the estate.
Nevertheless, the court held that the jlaintiffs were entitled to recover a
reasonable counsel fee from the estate which had been augmented by
their activity.
The principle is frequently applied to suits by minority stock-
holders to remedy wrongs done or threatened to the corporation or
to recover corporate property where the officers and directors have
acted wrongfully or have refused to protect the interests of the cor-
poration. Decatur Mineral Lands Co. v. Palm, (1896) 113 Ala. 531, 21
So. 315, 59 Am. St. Rep. 140.
In bankruptcy cases by express stattitory authorization, certain
allowances for counsel fees or expenses are made to the petitioning
creditors who by instituting the proceedings cause the estate to be im-
pounded, to creditors who recover property for the estate, and to credi-
tors who successfully oppose a composition. 11 U. S. C. A., sec. 104
(b), (2), (3), (4), Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 104 (b), (2), (3),
(4).
An elaborate collection of decisions on the allowance of counsel
fees from the fund is presented in. a note in 49 A. L. R. 1149.
17Johnston v. Stephens, (1924) 206 Ky. 83, 266 S. W. 881.
'1in re Union Dredging Co., (D. C. Del. 1915) 225 Fed. 188.
'Harrison v. Perea, (1897) 168 U. S. 325, 18 Sup. Ct. 129, 42 L.
Ed. 483.
2"Bank of Picher v. Harris, (1924) 100 Okla. 256, 229 Pac. 137,
40 A. L. R. 254; and see Decennial Digests, Pledges, Key No. 27.
"'National Fire Ins. Co. v. McEvoy Furniture Co.. (Tex. Civ. AIp.
1917) 192 S. W. 270, and see Decennial Digests, Garnishment, Key
No. 191.
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court's discretion, would be generally followed. This liberal and
enlightened practice is indeed adopted by statute in New Jersey.
23
It is fairly well settled that the general rule in equity cases, apart
from the common fund cases, is similar to that which obtains at
law,-that statutory costs mark the outside limit of recovery for
expenses of litigation.2 4
An interesting and important recent decision in the circuit court
of appeals for the eighth circuit in which a learned and vigorous
opinion was written by Booth, Circuit Judge, reviews historically
the powers and practice of the federal courts of equity in regard
to costs, and concludes that in chancery suits, though not in ac-
tions at law, the court has the discretionary power to allow costs
"beyond the statutory scale, as between solicitor and client," in-
cluding counsel fees and expenses, and that this discretion is
properly exercised against a party who has vexatiously instituted
groundless litigation against a pledgee attacking the pledgor's title
to the property and the validity of the debt due the pledgee.2 5 The
decision may be the benchmark of a new and salutary doctrine in
-
2McNamara v. Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc., (C.C.A. 5th Cir.
1902) 52 C. C. A. 530, 114 Fed. 910 and cases collected in Decennial
Digests, Interpleader, Key No. 35.
'31 New Jersey, Comp. St., 1910, title, Chancery, sec. 91, "In any
cause, matter or proceeding in the court of chancery the chancellor
may make such allowances by way of counsel fee to the party or
parties obtaining the order or decree as shall seem to him to be
reasonable and proper, and shall direct which of the parties shall pay
such allowances; or, where such allowances are ordered to be paid out
of property or funds, shall specify and direct the property or funds
liable therefor. The chancellor may provide for the inclusion of such
allowances in the taxable costs, or may provide for their collection in
such other manner as is agreeable to the practice of the court. Such
allowances shall be in lieu of any allowance for counsel fees now pro-
vided for by statute. In uncontested foreclosure causes, the allow-
ance for counsel fees shall not exceed five per centum of the amount
decreed for principal and interest, and shall be regulated by the
chancellor from time to time by a general rule; but in contested fore-
closure causes, counsel fees may be allowed to any party as herein
provided for in other causes, matters or proceedings in the court of
chancery." Moffatt v. Neimitz, (1928) 102 N. J. Eq. 112, 139 Atl.
798. 24Patterson v. Northern Trust Co., (1919) 286 Ill. 564, 122 N. E.
55 (Solicitor's fee of trustee, for defending frivolous suit of one of the
beneficiaries, allowed to be charged against the share of the complain-
ing beneficiary but the motion that it be taxed as costs against the
beneficiary denied in the absence of statutory authority); Parker v.
Mecklenberg Realty & Ins. Co., (1928) 195 N. C. 644, 143 S. E. 254(In suit to cancel notes and deed of trust for fraud, and for damages,
counsel fees not to be taxed as costs).
2 5Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co., (C.C.A. 8th
Cir. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 233.
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the federal courts that in equity the chancellor, even in cases
where no common fund is involved, may in his discretion award
counsel fees and expenses as costs against the losing party, at
least where the litigation has been groundless and vexatious. This
decision has, however, been reversed by the Supreme Court of
the United States,2 16 which did not pass upon this question which
remains an open one in the federal courts.
5. THE ALLOWANCE OF COUNSEL FEES AND EXPENSES IN SUITS
FOR DIVORCE OR SEPARATION.
In most states the court has the power, in a suit for divorce
or judicial separation, to make an order requiring the husband
to pay the reasonable counsel fees incurred or to be incurred by
the wife in the prosecution or defense of the suit.2 7 The practice
derives from the husband's duty to support the wife. Conse-
quently, the allowance may be made though the wife is unsuccess-
ful in the suit.2 8 The impecunious husband has no corresponding
right to such allowance from the wife.29 The conditions upon the
making of such allowance for "suit-money" to the wife in divorce
litigation vary from state to state. Statutes frequently regulate
the matter.
The special nature of the marital relation and the husband's
duty to support explain the allowance of such expenses in this
narrow class of cases, which have little bearing upon the general
topic of counsel fees and suit expenses as an element of recovery.
6. STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR THE RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS'
FEES IN SPECIAL CLASSES OF LITIGATION.
We have seen that in all the states provision for the recovery
of attorneys' fees as part of the costs of the litigation in which
the fees were incurred is either entirely lacking or is in the ar-
rested development stage where amounts fixed by early statutes
are now entirely inadequate and trivial as compared with the
26(1930) 281 U. S. 1, 50 Sup. Ct. 194, 74 L. Ed. 659.
27Jensen v. Jensen, (Neb. 1930) 229 N. W. 770; Richard v. Rich-
ard, (1930) 142 Okla. 302, 286 Pac. 900: Ortman v. Ortman, (1919)
203 Ala. 167, 82 So. 417; Walker v. Walker, (1923) 190 Cal. 575, 213
Pac. 967; Cason v. Cason, (1924) 158 Ga. 395, 123 S. E. 713; Crane
v. Crane, (1916) 128 Md. 214, 97 Atl. 535; Smiley v. Smiley, (1925)
136 Wash. 241, 239 Pac. 551 (travel expense of wife); and cases cited
Decennial Digests, Divorce, Key No. 221.
28Towson v. Towson, (1919) 49 App. D. C. 45, 258 Fed. 517.
29State v. Superior Court, (1922) 121 Wash. 359, 207 Pac. 227,
(Wash. 1923) 211 Pac. 767, 24 A. L. R. 488.
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actual prevailing scale of charges by lawyers. Among the few-
instances where any very widely applicable provisions are made
for the allowance of counsel fees are the statute of New Jersey,
already referred to, which makes it discretionary with the chancel-
lor in equity cases to allow a reasonable counsel fee to a party
who is successful in securing an order or decree,30 and the pro-
visions in the city code of Baltimore which in actions on contract,
express or implied, brought under the speedy judgments procedure,
enable the successful party in case of dispute and trial to recover
a reasonable counsel fee, not less than twenty-five nor more than
one hundred dollars,31 and finally the section of the Georgia Code
which permits the jury to allow the plaintiff his expenses of liti-
gation in any case where "the defendant has acted in bad faith,
or has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff un-
necessary trouble and expense. '32
In many, if not most of the jurisdictions of this country
while such general provisions for the recovery of counsel fees
are lacking, isolated statutes have been passed setting up certain
special classes of cases wherein the allowance of attornys' fees
is provided for. Thus, under acts of Congress, reasonable attor-
neys' fees are allowed to the successful claimant in actions to
enforce orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission against
carriers for the payment of money,3 3 and the same allowance may
be made to the "prevailing party" in actions for the infringement
of the copyright law 34 and to one who successfully sues for
injury caused by violating the anti-trust laws.3 5
The legislatures of the states have quite generally adopted
such special attorney's fees statutes. The classes of cases most
commonly singled out are cases of claims against carriers for
freight, overcharges, wages, killing of stock, setting fires, and
the like,"" and claims against life and fire insurance companies
30See note 23, supra.3 lMaryland, Laws 1898, ch. 123, sec. 315, p. 394, amended by Laws
1908, ch. 644, p. 608 (applied in Hammond v. American Express Co.,(1908) 107 Mr. 295, 313, 68 Atl. 496; and Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mur-
ray, (1909) 111 Md. 600, 608, 75 Atl. 348.32Georgia Code, 1910, sec. 4392.
3349 U. S. C. A. sec. 16 (2), Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 49, sec. 16(2) held constitutional in Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co., (1914) 236
U. S. 412, 35 Sup. Ct. 328, 59 L. Ed. 644, Ann. Cas. 1916B 691.
3417 U. S. C. A. sec. 40, Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 17, sec. 40.
3515 U. S. C. A., sec. 15 (Clayton Act), Mason's U. S. Code, tit.
15, sec. 15.36See the statutes discussed in Missouri, K. & T. Ry, Co. v. Cade,(1914) 233 U. S. 642, 34 Sup. Ct. 678, 58 L. Ed. 1135; Atlantic Coast
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upon policies of insurance.3 7  Other classes of cases sometimes
selected are election contests,38 actions for slander,39 eminent
domain proceedings,4" suits against non-residents,
4 wage claims,4 2
and suits by laborers and material men to enforce mechanics'
liens.43 Often a liability for an attorney's fee is imposed as an
additional penalty for violation of statutes, as in cases of viola-
tion of laws requiring railways to fence their right-of-way" or
to keep them free of combustible material, 45 cases of failure to
pay taxes, 4 6 or special assessments47 promptly, violations of stat-
Line Ry. Co. v. Coachman, (1910) 59 Fla. 130, 52 So. 377, 20 Ann.
Cas. 1047; Smith v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. Ry. Co., (1916) 99 Neb.
719, 157 N. W. 622; Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Simson, (1902) 64
Kan. 802, 68 Pac. 653, 57 L. R. A. 768, 91 Am. St. Rep. 248.
37See statutes discussed in Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mettler,
(1902) 185 U. S. 308, 22 Sup. Ct. 662, 46 L. Ed. 922; Arkansas Ins. Co.
v. McManus, (1908) 86 Ark. 115, 110 S. W. 797; Fillis v. Liverpool L.
& G. Ins. Co., (1903) 46 Fla. 268, 35 So. 171, 110 Am. St. Rep. 89; Harp
v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., (1908) 130 Ga. 726, 61 S. E. 704, 14 Ann.
Cas. 299; British Am. Assur. Co. v. Bradford, (1898) 60 Kan. 85, 55
Pac. 335; Keller v. Home Life Ins. Co. (1906) 198 Mo. 440, 95 S. W.
903; Johnson v. St. P. F. & M. Ins. Co., (1920) 104 Neb. 831, 178
N. W. 926; Union C. L. Ins. Co. v. Chowning, (1894) 86 Tex. 654, 26
S. W. 982, 24 L. R. A. 504; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilson Co.,
(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1925) 4 F. (2d) 835.
38Doty v. Reece, (1917) 53 Mont. 404, 164 Pac. 542.
'
9 Skrocki v. Stahl, (1910) 14 Cal. App. 1, 110 Pac. 957.
4OGano v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., (1901) 114 Iowa 713, 87 N.
W. 714, 55 L. R. A. 263, 89 Am. St. Rep. 393, affirmed without opinion,
(1903) 190 U. S. 557, 23 Sup. Ct. 854, 47 L. Ed. 1183; Sacramento v.
Swanston, (1915) 29 Cal. App. 212, 115 Pac. 101.
41Williams v. Sapieba, (Tex Civ. App. 1900) 59 S. W. 947.
.2Vogel v. Pekoc, (1895) 157 Ill. 339, 42 N. E. 386, 30 L. R. A. 491.
But such statutes have been held unconstitutional in some instances.
Lorenson v. Webb, (1916) 11 Miss. 89, 71 So. 273; C. R. I. & P. Ry.
Co. v. Mashore, (1908) 21 Okla. 275, 96 Pac. 630, 17 Ann. Cas. 277;
Hocking Valley Coal Co. v. Rosser, (1895) 53 Ohio St. 12, 41 N. E.
263, 29 L. R. A. 386, 53 Am. St. Rep. 622.
43Duckwall v. Jones, (1900) 156 Ind. 682, 58 N. E. 1055, (1901)
60 N. E. 797; Title Guaranty & T. Co. v. Wrenn, (1899) 35 Or. 62, 56
Pac. 271, 76 Am. St. Rep. 454. Many such statutes have been held
invalid as for example, in Union Terminal Co. v. Turner Construction
Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1918) 159 C. C. A. 585, 247 Fed. 727 where a
Florida statute was decided to be unconstitutional. The decisions
are collected in a note to the case last mentioned, "Validity of stat-
utory provisions for attorneys' fees," in 11 A. L. R. 884, 906, 908.
44Peoria, D. & E. Ry. Co. v. Duggan, (1884) 109 Ill. 537, 50
Am. Rep. 619; Hindman v. Oregon Short Line Ry. Co., (1918) 32
Idaho 133, 178 Pac. 837.
45Cleveland v. C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., (1900) 200 Ill. 633, 66 N. E.
389.
4U. S. Electric P. & L. Co. v. State, (1894) 79 Md. 63, 28 Atl.768.
4 7Engebretson v. Gay, (1910) 158 Cal. 30, 109 Pac. 880, 28 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 1062, Ann. Cas. 1912A 690.
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utes regulating railway rates, 8 and failure to furnish cars to
shippers as required by statute.49 Such imposition of liability for
attorneys' fees as a penalty is upheld almost uniformly, but stat-
utes not based on the penalty theory have, in some instances, been
successfully challenged as denying due process or equal protection
of the laws. It is argued that statutes which allow attorneys'
fees only to plaintiffs and not to defendants are subject to these
objections for that reason alone, and many cases, particularly the
earlier ones, have so held, 0 but this view has not generally pre-
vailed.51 Most of the statutes which have been sustained are of
this unilateral type. Only wheie the court has determined that at-
torney's fee statutes unreasonably single out and discriminate
against a certain group of debtors they will, in most jurisdictions,
be stricken down. Thus a statute in Texas which allowed attor-
neys' fees in *actions on labor, freight, and damage claims of
fifty dollars or less against railway corporations was held invalid
by the Supreme Court of the United States, 52 but when the legis-
lature subsequently amended the act to apply to "any person or
corporation doing business in this state" it was sustained as a
"police regulation designed to promote the prompt payment of
small claims and to discourage unnecessary litigation in respect
to them. '5 3 The court said:
"If the classification is otherwise reasonable, the mere fact
that attorney's fees are allowed to successful plaintiffs only, and
4 St. Louis Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, (1919) 251
U. S. 63, 40 Sup. Ct. 71, 64 L. Ed. 139.49See Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Vosburg, (1915) 238 U. S.
56, 35 Sup. Ct. 675, 59 L. Ed. 1199, L. R. A. 1915E 953 where such a
statute was held invalid because the attorney's fee provision was not
reciprocal.
r 0Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Mashore, (1908) 21 Okla. 275,
96 Pac. 630, 17 Ann. Cas. 277; Davidson v. Jennings, (1900) 27 Colo.
187, 60 Pac. 354, 48 L. R. A. 340, 83 Am. St. Rep. 49.
U1See the cases cited in the earlier notes in this section, in all
of which unless otherwise indicated in the note, the court sustained the
validity of the particular statutes.
52Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, (1897) 165 U. S. 150, 17 Sup.
Ct. 255, 41 L. Ed. 666.
53Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Cade, (1914) 233 U. S. 642, 34 Sup.
Ct. 678, 58 L. Ed. 1135. The Vosburg Case, (1915) 238 U. S. 56,
35 Sup. Ct. 675, 59 L. Ed. 1199, L. R. A. 1915E 953, holds invalid a law
which imposes an attorney's fee upon a railway for refusal to furnish
cars promptly but fails to impose such a fee upon a shipper who is
required by, the same law to use the car promptly. The court dis-
tinguished the Cade Case on the ground that the distinction there be-
tween plaintiff and defendant was a legitimate one while the dis-
tinction in the liabilities of shipper and carrier for violation of the
reciprocal obligations to furnish and use cars, was not.
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not to successful defendants, does not render the statute repug-
nant to the 'equal protection' clause. This is not a discrimination
between different citizens or classes of citizens, since members of
any and every class may either sue or be sued. Actor and reus
differ in their respective attitudes towards a litigation; the former
has the burden of seeking the proper jurisdiction and bringing
the proper parties before it, as well as the burden of proof upon
the main issues; and these differences may be made the basis of
distinctive treatment respecting the allowance of an attorney's
fee as a part of the costs .... The allowance is confined to a rea-
sonable attorney's fee, not exceeding twenty dollars, where an
attorney is actually employed; the amount to be determined by
the court or jury trying the case. Manifestly, the purpose is
merely to require the defendant to reimburse the plaintiff for a
part of his expenses not otherwise recoverable as 'costs of suit.'
So far as it goes, it imposes only compensatory damages upon a
defendant who, in the judgment of the legislature; unreasonably
delays and resists payment of a just demand. The outlay for an
attorney's fee is a necessary consequence of the litigation, and
since it must fall upon one party or the other, it is reasonable to
impose it upon the party whose refusal to pay a just claim renders
the litigation necessary. The allowance of ordinary costs of suit
to the prevailing party rests upon the same principle."
These state statutes sometimes expressly provide that the at-
torneys' fees shall be allowed as "costs."54  If not thus denomi-
nated, usually they are construed as constituting part of the amount
involved for jurisdictional purposes. Even when attorneys' fees
are allowed as "costs" by a state statute, they may still be recov-
erable in an action in the federal court though, of course, ordinary
costs in that court would be limited to those embraced in the fed-
eral costs statutes. 55
7. FEES AND EXPENSES OF A PREVIOUS LITIGATION
For the expense incurred in the present litigation we have found
that our law generally gives the successful party no recompense
beyond the taxable costs which ordinarily include only a portion
of his expense. This is the case, however wrongful the suit or
groundless the defense.5" On the other hand, where the present
defendant has by his wrongful conduct, be it tort or breach of
54Conner v. Conn. F. Ins. Co., (D.C. Fla. 1923) 292 Fed. 767;
editorial note, (1924) 10 Va..L. Rev. 464; State v. Barrs, (1924) 87 Fla.
168, 99 So. 668.55Business Men's Assur. Co. of America v. Campbell, (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 223.
56Corinth Bank & Trust Co. v. Security N. Bank, (1923) 148
Tenn. 136, 252 S. W. 1001; Decennial Digests, Damages, Key No. 71, 72.
But compare the Georgia statute cited in note 32 supra.
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contract,5 7 caused the present plaintiff to defend or prosecute
previous legal proceedings the law reverses its restrictive atti-
tude and allows the plaintiff to recover all the expense, including
counsel fees, reasonably incurred by him in the prior litigation.58
S. WHERE THE PREVIOUS LIGATIoN IS DUE TO DEFENDANT'S
TORT.
Fraud is a frequent source of liability for expenses of litiga-
tion. A life insurance company's agents secured premium notes
from plaintiff by fraudulent statements falsely describing the
policy to be issued, and the company transferred the notes to a
good-faith holder who sued on the notes. Plaintiff, having sub-
stantial grounds for believing that the transferee had conspired
with the company to perpetrate the fraud, defended that suit
and lost. He was allowed to recover the attorney's fee and ex-
penses incurred in that defense.59  A similar liability was imposed
on one who fraudulently procured the plaintiff bank to issue a
draft in return for his own check drawn without funds, for the
expenses incurred by the bank in settling with a bona fide holder
from whom defendant secured cash for the draft.6 0 Where a seller
of land falsely states that he has a good title, the pur-
chaser may, if he discovers the falsity before "closing the trade,"
recover the expense of having the title examined.61 Where the
purchaser has accepted a deed, and has contracted to build a house.
he may recover from the seller the cost of reasonably but unsuc-
cessfully resisting a suit by the contractor for his failure to carry
out the contract. 2 The fraudulent seller who falsely claimed to
have title, in a recent Nev Jersey case, has even been held liable
-and it seems correctly-for the attorneys' fees and expenses in-
curred by the buyer in suing the seller himself for specific per-
formance which suit was defeated by the seller's want of title.6 3
57Am. Law Inst. Restatement, Contracts, sec. 325.58See cases cited in the notes to the three following sections and
Decennial Digests, Damages, Key No. 73.5
"McOsker v. Federal Ins. Co., (1924) 115 Kan. 626, 224 Pac. 53.
Compare Indiana v. Life Ins. Co., (1919) 186 Ky. 81, 215 S. W. 949.
OOHutchinson First N. Bank v. Williams, (1901) 62 Kari. 431, 63
Pac. 744.
"'Rabinowitz v. Marcus, (1923) 100 Conn. 86, 123 Atl. 21.62Curtley v. Security Savings Society, (1907) 46 Wash. 50, 89
Pac. 180.63Feldmesser v. Lemberger, (1925) 101 N. J. L. 184, 127 Atl. 815,
41 A. L. R. 1153. The court held that the decree as to costs in the
chancery suit for specific performance was not determinative of the
present claim for reimbursement of expense of that litigation.
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This case is to be compared, however, with a recent Minne-
sota decision64 which involved these facts: A husband had pro-
cured a certificate of fraternal benefit insurance on his life pay-
able to his wife. The children fraudulently induced him to have
issued a new certificate in their favor, excluding the wife. The
wife sued the insurer which interpleaded the children and in that
suit the later certificate was cancelled and judgment given for the
wife on the earlier one. The wife now brings a new suit against
the children for the expense of the earlier suit. The decision
denies a recovery on the ground that such recovery of expense is
allowed only where the previous litigation is with third persons
and not where the real contest was with the present defendant. It
is submitted, however, that the true test is whether the present de-
fendant has been guilty of some wrongful conduct and the present
plaintiff has been involved thereby in some litigation other than a
mere suit by the present plaintiff to secure redress for such con-
duct. 5 Thus if the previous suit in the New Jersey case had been
one for rescission and damages for the fraud, instead of for
specific performance of the contract, no new- action would have
lain for the expense of the previous suit. In this light, the Min-
nesota case is correctly decided if, as the court suggests, the pre-
vious suit was really one for redress for the defendant's fraud,
although one remains doubtful whether, but for defendant's fraud,
any action as against the third party, the insurance association,
would have become necessary.
Breaches of official duty may likewise subject the victim to
the necessity of engaging in litigation, for the expense of which
he may recover from the officer. Thus, violations of the civil
service law by wrongfully removing a city treasurer from office,
forcing him to undergo the expense of suing for reinstatement,
rendered the council members who participated in the wrongful
removal liable for such expense.66 A constable who accepted irre-
sponsible sureties on forthcoming bonds given by defendants in
replevin was held liable for the plaintiff's expense in bringing,
the replevin action and in a subsequent fruitless action on the
bonds.67
64Stickney v. Goward, (1925) 161 Minn. 457, 201 N. W. 630, 39 A.
L. R. 1216.65As to which, see note 68, herein.
G6Stiles v. Morse, (1919) 233 Mass. 174, 123 N. E. 614, 4 A. L. R.
1465. A similar holding was made in behalf of one who had been
wrongfully demoted. Ashton v. Wolstenholme, (1922) 243 Mass. 193,
137 N. E. 376.
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Obviously, a party who wins a law suit cannot escape the rule
that expenses of litigation beyond taxable costs are not recover-
able, by merely instituting a new suit for such expense in the first
case."5 In about one-half the states, however, a successful de-
fendant against whom a civil litigation, though unaccompanied by
interference with person or property, has been instituted mali-
ciously and without probable cause, may bring an action for mali-
cious prosecution 0 and recover expenses and counsel fees in-
curred in defense of the previous action.70  England7 1 and the
other states limit the action to cases of malicious criminal prose-
cution and to civil suits where the person was arrested, property
seized as by attachment or the like or where other special injury
was sustained.7 2 Under the latter view, while of course all rea-
sonable expenses and counsel fees in cases of malicious criminal
prosecution would be recoverable,73 in actions for malicious civil
litigation seemingly only those expenses and counsel fees reason-
ably necessary to secure the release of person or property, and not
those incurred in the general defense of the action would be re-
coverable. 7
4
Where defendants by defaming plaintiff's title to land and
setting up false claims thereto have forced plaintiff to sue them
to remove the cloud from his title, he may recover in his subse-
quent action for slander of title the expense of the prior suit
notwithstanding his recovery of the usual costs in the previous
action.
75
67Stern v. Knowlton, (1903) 184 Mass. 29, 67 N. E. 869.
68Marvin v. Prentice, (1884) 94 N. Y. 295 (Grantor sues in equity
for a reconveyance on ground that the deed, in form absolute, was in-
tended as security for a loan, and he is successful; held, he cannot
in a new suit recover the expense and counsel fees incurred in the
first.)
69Peerson v. Ashcraft Cotton Mills, (1917) 201 Ala. 348, 78 So.
204, L. R. A. 1918D 540; Teesdale v. Liebschwager, (1919) 42 S. D.
323, 174 N. W. 620, and decisions cited in these opinions.
7°Kolka v. Jones, (1897) 6 N. D. 461, 71 N. W. 538, 66 Am. St.
Rep. 615.7 1Quartz Hill Cons. Gold Mining Co. v. Eyre, (1883) 11 Q. B. D.
674, 690.
72Supreme Lodge v. Muverzagt, (1892) 76 Md. 140, 24 Atl. 323;
White v. International Text Book Co., (1912) 156 Iowa 210, 136 N. W.
121, 42 L. R. A. (N.S.) 346; Jerome v. Shaw, (1916) 172 N. C. 862, 90
S. E. 764, L. R. A. 1917B 749.
73Wren v. Relifeld, (1916) 37 S. D. 201, 157 N. W. 323; McIntosh
v. Wales, (1913) 21 Wyo. 397, 134 Pac. 274, Ann. Cas. 1916 C 273;
Wheeler v. Hanson, (1894) 161 Mass. 370, 37 N. E. 382 (expense ofprocuring sureties on bail bond and counsel fees).
74Gretin v. Levy, (1885) 37 La. Ann. 182.
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9. WHERE THE DEFENDANT HAS SUBJECTED THE PLAINTIFF TO
THE PRIOR LITIGATION BY His BREACH OF
CONTRACT OR ASsUMED DUTY.
Where land is conveyed with covenants of title and the grantee
is subjected to litigation with owners of adverse interests, who es-
tablish their claims, the grantor who has covenanted against the
existence of such flaws in the title or who has warranted to defend
the title against such claims is liable not only for the defect of
title but for the grantee's reasonable and necessary expense in-
curred in the prior litigation, including costs and counsel fees."8
It is usually held that to recover such expense, the covenantor
must have been notified to assume the defense of the prior
action and have declined to do so." The minority view, which
does not require the grantee thus to relinquish control of his fight
for the land, in order to secure reimbursement for expenses of
litigation,78 seems preferable. A like liability for counsel fees and
expense of suit is imposed on the landlord when the tenant rea-
sonably attempts to defend his possession against a paramount
title,79 or even when the landlord himself breaches the covenant
for quiet enjoyment by harassing the tenant by a groundless evic-
tion suit. 0
A similiar situation arises in cases where goods are sold with
a warranty of title express or implied, the buyer becomes involved
in litigation with third persons who successfully establish a
paramount claim, and the seller is required to reimburse the buyer
for the expense of the litigation.8 ' The same result would seem
7SChesebro v. Powers, (1889) 78 Mich. 472, 44 N. W. 290. But
compare Toop v. Palmer, (1922) 108 Neb. 850, 189 N. W. 394.76Seitz v. People's Savings Bank, (1905) 140 Mich. 106, 103 N. W.
545; Culver v. Jennings, (1911) 157 N. C. 565, 72 S. E. 1005; Rennie v.
Gibson, (1919) 75 Okla, 282, 183 Pac. 483; Estep v. Bailey, (1919)
94 Or. 59, 185 Pac. 227; Van Cott v. Jacklin, (1924) 63 Utah 412,
226 Pac. 460; Decennial Digests, Covenants, Key No. 132.
77 Wiggins v. Pender, (1903) 132 N. C. 628, 44 S. E. 362, 61 L. R.
A. 772; Smith v. Boynton Land & Lumber Co., (1917) 131 Ark. 22,
198 S. W. 107; Wilson v. McGoward, (1921) 192 Ky. 565, 234 S. W. 17;
Smith v. Gaines, (1923) 210 Ala. 245, 97 So. 739.78Richmond v. Ames, (1895) 164 Mass. 467, 41 N. E. 671 (dictum).7 9Ralph v. Crouch, (1867) L. R. 3 Ex. 44; Handy v. Street, (1913)
169 Mo. App. 593, 155 S. W. 43; Decennial Digests, Landlord and
Tenant, Key No. 180.
8 0Levitzky v. Canning, (1867) 33 Cal. 299. Compare Heitzel v.
Weber, (1926) 118 Okla. 82, 246. Pac. 839, where a state court held
that counsel fees in a previous suit in the United States court, which
suit was instituted in violation of an injunction issued by the state
court, were not recoverable.8
'Edwards v. Beard, (1924) 211 Ala. 251, 100 So. 101; St. Anthony
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to follow where the buyer has sold again and, reasonably relying
on the seller's warranty of title or quality, makes a similiar war-
ranty to the sub-buyer and becomes involved in litigation with the
sub-buyer for breach of warranty. But in the early Massachusetts
case of Reggio v. Braggiottis2 where the seller guaranteed the
article sold to be genuine opium and the buyer re-sold it as such
and was forced to defend a suit by the second buyer for breach
of warranty, the first buyer was allowed to recover (in addition
to the value of the opium agreed to be sold) reimbursement only
for the court costs of the previous suit and not for counsel fees.
Shaw, C. J., said:
"But the counsel fees cannot be allowed. These are expenses
incurred by the party for his own satisfaction, and they vary so
much with the character and distinction of the counsel, that it
would be dangerous to permit him to impose such a charge upon
an opponent; and the law measures the expenses incurred in the
management of a suit by the taxable costs."
These reasons are obviously untenable and would operate to
deny all recovery of counsel fees in previous litigation. Other
reasons offered in a subsequent decision s3 explaining the earlier
case were that the plaintiff should never recover for expense of
suit where the previous action was based upon the present plain-
tiff's own breach of contract or tort,84 and the further reason that
the original buyer might thus be subjected to a cumulative liabil-
ity for reimbursement on an infinite succession of breach-of-
warranty suits by successive sub-buyers. These seem insufficient
reasons to deny redress to one who has by reasonable reliance -on
the seller's warranty justifiably incurred expense to defend the title
or quality of the goods.8 5
Co. v. Dawson, (1910) 20 N. D. 18, 126 N. W. 1013; Ann. Cas. 1912B
1337; Decennial Digests, Sales, Key No. 442.
82(1851) 7 Cush. (Mass.) 166, 170.
83Inhabitants of Westfield v. Mayo, (1877) 122 Mass. 100, 23
Am. Rep. 292.84This restriction was applied-and its inequity thus made apparent
-in Beacon M. Car Co. v. Shadman, (1917) 226 Mass. 570, 116 N. E.
559. In that case the present plaintiff, a motor storage company, had
delivered an automobile to the defendant, the owner's daughter. The
ovner sue& the present plaintiff for conversion and recovered. The
court denied recovery of counsel fees because the plaintiff's delivery
of the automobile to the defendant at the latter's request was the
plaintiff's "own wrongful act."
S5 Reggio v. Braggiotti, (1851) 7 Cush. (Mass.) 166, 170, is dis-
approved in 1 Sedgvick, Damages, 9th ed., sec. 349, and 2 Williston,
Sales, 2nd ed., 615-a, note 87. A recent case of warrant of quality,
allowing recovery by the buyer of expense of litigation is Abounader v.
Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., (1926) 207 App. Div. 43, 215 N. Y. S. 702.
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Situations often arise when one person, A, is rendered liable
to a third person under circumstances which impose upon an-
other person, B, a legal duty to indemnify A against the judg-
ment and also the expense of litigation.8 A frequent instance
is the situation which arises when a contractor, or any other
person, digs a hole or places a dangerous obstruction in a city
street. The city's duty to use care to maintain safe streets ren-
ders it liable to any person who is injured by the hole or obstruc-
tion, but the active wrong-doer is liable over to the city and this
liability includes costs and expenses.87 Analogous are the cases
where a master has been held liable to a third person for a tort
committed by his servant in the scope of the employment but in
violation of orders, and conversely where the third person has
sued the servant who has injured him while obeying the master's
orders. In these varied situations where A is liable to the third
person, but as between A and B, B is primarily responsible for
the claim, it is usually said that while B must reimburse A for
the judgment paid to the third person with interest, he could be
held liable for A's outlay for costs, expenses and counsel fees
only if A has notified B to come in and defend. 8 This require-
ment is of doubtful justice, and it has usually been announced
in cases where the question was not involved, as the notice had
been given.
10. CONTRACTS T-O REIMBURSE FOR ExPENSES AND COUNSEL FEES
AND BONDS GIVEN IN THE COURSE OF LITIGATION
Obviously, if one party agrees, on sufficient consideration, to
reimburse another for counsel fees and expenses incurred in some
litigation, no difficulty arises in enforcing the promise. The ques-
tion of interpretation may occur-was the agreement intended
to have this effect? Such questions of interpretation frequently
have arisen in connection with actions upon bonds given, as re-
quired by statute or rule, by the applicant who seeks the issuance
of some summary writ such as attachment or the making of some
emergency order before final hearing, such as the appointment of
a receiver or the granting of a preliminary injunction. Generaliza-
86See Decennial Digests, Indemnity, Key No. 9 (2).871nhabitants of Westfield v. Mayo, (1877) 122 Mass. 100, 23
Am. Rep. 292; Waterbury v. Waterbury Traction Co., (1901) 74 Conn.
152, 50 Atl. 3; Astoria v. Astoria Ry. Co., (1913) 67 Or. 538, 136 Pac.
645, 49 L. R. A. (N.S.) 404.
ssBaltimore, etc., Ry. Co. v. Howard County, (1910) 113 Md. 404,
77 Atl. 930.
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tions about the extent of liability for counsel fees and expenses
upon these attachment bonds, bonds for injunction and the like,
are unprofitable as their terms and interpretation vary from state
to state under the diverse provisions of the local statutes. Us-
ually such bonds contain covenants to pay "all damages" in case
it shall be determined that the writ or order was wrongfully
granted. Occasionally the courts deny recovery of counsel fees
altogether on such bonds,89 but the more usual attitude is to in-
clude in the damages awarded the expense incurred in resisting
and securing the dissolution of the wrongful writ or order, but not
the expense and fees of the general defense of the main action.9"
11. WHAT FEES AND EXPENSES ARE RECOVERABLE. PRQUIRE-
mENT OF REASONABLENESS.
Expenses of litigation, including counsel fees, are subject to
the limitation which obtains wherever plaintiff seeks recovery of
expenses of any sort on the ground that they have been incurred
by reason of defendant's actionable conduct-the restriction that
the outlay must be of such an amount and made under such cir-
cumstances as that a reasonable man would have incurred it.91 Con-
sequently, if the present plaintiff has undergone expense in con-
testing the previous litigation when he was without reasonable
grounds to believe that he had a defense, the expense of making
the contest should not be recoverable.92 Likewise, if the present
s9Oelrichs v. Spain, (1872) 15 Wall. (U.S.) 211, 21 L. Ed. 43(injunction bond); Midgett v. Vann, (1911) 158 N. C. 128, 73 S. E.
801; Chillicothe Bank v. McSwain, (1912) 93 S. C. 30, 75 S. E. 1106,
Ann. Cas. 1914D 809, and note (attachment).
90Injunction bonds: Bartholomae Brewing Co. v. Modzelewski,
(1915) 269 Ill. 539, 109 N. E. 1058; C. H. Albers Comm'n. Co. v.
Spencer, (1911) 236 Mo. 608, 631, 139 S. W. 321, Ann. Cas. 1912D
705; but the entire expense of defending the suit may be allowed where
the sole purpose of the suit is to procure the temporary injunction, see
Prager's Paris Fashion v. Seidenbach, (1925) 113 Okla. 271, 242 Pac.
260; Decennial Digest, Injunctions, Key No. 252.
Attachment bonds: Tyngs American Surety Co., (1903) 174 N. Y.
166, 66 N. E. 668; Plymouth Gold Mining Co. v. United States, F. & G.
Co., (1906) 35 Mont. 23, 88 Pac. 565, 10 Ann. Cas. 951; 1 Sedgwvick,
Damages, 9th ed., sec. 257.
9
*Cleland v. McLaurin, (1925) 40 Idaho 371, 232 Pac. 571, 573.
"The expense of litigation can be recovered only if necessarily in-
curred and reasonable in amount, and allegations to that effect are
necessary in the pleading. There are no such allegations in the com-
plaint. The trial court had before it neither pleading nor evidence of !he
necessity or reasonableness of the alleged expense. For the above
reasons we conclude that the court erred in awarding damages."
021ndiana Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Butler, (1919) 186 Ky. 81, 215
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plaintiff has in the previous litigation employed several counsel
where one was sufficient to the task in hand, he can recover only
the reasonable expense of employing one.93
Other items of expense of litigation must likewise have been
prudently incurred to be recoverable. They may include such
expenditures as travel expense of witnesses, telegrams, 94 and cost
of securing bonds necessary in the course of litigation9 Some-
times the plaintiff's own necessary traveling expense is allowed, 6
as seemingly it should be; but the courts, fearful of over-exploita-
tion, have balked at allowing to plaintiff the value of his own
time necessarily consumed in the preparation for and attendance
on the trial of the previous litigation,9" except as an element of
damages in actions for malicious prosecution."8
12. CRITICISM OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW AS TO RE-
COVERY OF COUNSEL FEES AND EXPENSES OF LITIGATION
Under our law, counsel fees and expenses of suit are, in the
main, not recoverable but must be borne by the person who incurs
them. As respects counsel fees this is, as we have seen, a de-
S. W. 949 (semble); Gallo v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, (1908) 129 App.
Div. 698, 114 N. Y. S. 78, reversed without touching this point, (1910)
199 N. Y. 222, 92 N. E. 633.93Massena Savings Bank v. Garside, (1911) 151 Iowa 168, 130 N.
W. 918.94Hutchinson First Nat'l Bank v. Williams, (1901) 62 Kan. 431, 63
Pac. 744.
9 5Wheeler v. Hanson, (1894) 161 Mass. 370, 37 N. E. 382.
96Prager's Paris Fashion v. Seidenbach, (1925) 113 Okla. 271,
242 Pac. 260 (corporation allowed to recover for the expense of its
manager for travel to attend trial, but denying recovery for his loss
of time on the ground that he was to be considered as if he were the
corporation itself and hence a party).9 7Bartram v. Ohio & B. S. R. Co., (1910) 141 Ky. 100, 132 S. W.
188 (injunction bond); Prager's Paris Fashion Case, (1925) 113 Okla.
271, 242 Pac. 260; Midgett v. Vann, (1911) 158 N. C. 128, 73 S. E.
801. Compare Trustees v. Greenaugh, (1881) 105 U. S. 527, 26 L. Ed.
1157, where the court in awarding counsel fees and other expenses of
litigation to a complainant who had by his prosecution of suits against
the trustees of a fund, preserved the fund for the benefit of numerous
bondholders, refused to allow the complainant any compensation for
his own services, or reimbursement for his railroad fares and hotel
bills incurred in the litigation, and said: "It would present too great
a temptation to parties to intermeddle in the management of valuable
property or funds in which! they have only the interest of creditors,
and that perhaps only to a small amount, if they could calculate upon
the allowance of a salary for their time and of having all their private
expenses paid. Such an allowance has neither reason nor authority
for its support."
9sHelfer v. Hamburg Quarry Co., (1921) 208 Mlo. App. 58, 233 S.
W. 275; contra: Osborn v. Moore, (1857) 12 La. Ann. 714.
DAMAGES: COUNSEL FEES AND EXPENSES
parture from the English practice-a divergence that has wid-
ened with the gradual fall in the value of money since colonial
times-which has rendered the statutory taxable fees inadequate.
The chief exceptions or qualifications of the rule are: (1) the
allowance of taxable costs which cover a fractional part of such
fees and expenses; and (2) the allowance of counsel fees and
expenses (a) from an estate or fund impounded in court for its
creation, preservation, or administration, (b) in suits for divorce
or judicial separation, (c) under local statutes allowing attorneys'
fees in certain narrowly restricted classes of suits, (d) in actions
for wanton wrongs, attorneys' fees are allowed in some states as
exemplary damages, and (e) the recovery of counsel fees and
expenses of a previous litigation which plaintiff has incurred as
a result of defendant's wrongful conduct.
Is the present rule denying reimbursement, except within these
narrow limits, to the successful litigant for his necessary outlay a
desirable one? These are the arguments usually advanced in its
support. First, these elements of injury are too "remote." 99
Second, counsel fees would be exorbitant if they could be charged
to the adversary, and difficulties of administration would arise
in scaling the charges down to a reasonable amount.1°0 Third,
compensation is given only for wrongful conduct and it is not
(except where an unfounded suit is brought maliciously) wrong-
ful to bring a suit or defend one, at least where the litigant has a
reasonable doubt as to his claims which are being litigated 1-0t
Fourth, it is undesirable to discourage the "submission of rights to
90 "Now the expenses of litigation are never damages sued for
in any case when the action is brought for the wrong itself, not even
if the tort be wanton or malicious. They are not the. 'natural and
proximate consequences of the wrongful act,' which is the universal
rule, but are remote, future and contingent," Ellsworth, J., in St.
Peter's Church v. Beach, (1857) 26 Conn. 355, 366.
100"There is no fixed standard by which the honorarium can be
measured. Some counsel demand much more than others. Some
clients are willing to pay more than others. More counsel may be
employed than are necessary. When both client and counsel know that
the fees are to be paid by the other party there is danger of abuse.
A reference to a master, or in an issue to a jury, might be necessary
to ascertain the proper amount, and this grafted litigation might pos-
sibly be more animated and protracted than that in the original cause.
It would be an office of some delicacy on, the part of the court to
scale down the charges, as might sometimes be necessary," Swayne.
J. in Oelrich v. Spain, (1872) 15 Wall. (U.S.) 211, 21 L. Ed. 43.
'
01See St. Peter's Church v. Beach, (1857) 26 Conn. 355; Satter-
thwaite, Increasing Costs to be Paid by Losing Party, (1923) 46
N. J. L. J. 133.
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judicial determination" by subjecting the loser to heavy damage
by reason of such submission. 10 2 Finally, Sedgwick asserts,10 3 in
the form of a reason, what may be intended as a suggestion that
the rule has no rational basis, as follows: "The true foundation
of the rule we take to be that the common law has arbitrarily
fixed taxable costs as the limit of remuneration for expenses of
litigation."
On the other side may be noted these considerations. The ob-
jection of "remotenes" taken literally seems fallacious, for the
expenses of a previous litigation seem no nearer or more direct
results of the tort or breach of contract which caused the previous
suit th~an are the expenses of the present suit, the results of the
unfounded contest of the losing party. Nevertheless, the objec-
tion suggests this germ of truth, that entire completeness of com-
'
02In Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir.
1924) 297 Fed. 791, 799, the court in denying recovery of an attorney's
fee for plaintiff incurred in the successful defense of a previous action
brought by the present defendent, (see supra, note 68) said: "In
Wetmore v. Mellinger, (1884) 64 Iowa 741, 18 N. W. 870, 52 Am.
Rep. 465, the court, in deciding that an action will not lie for the
institution of a civil action with malice and without probable cause,
where there has been no arrest of the person or seizure of property
and no special injury sustained, well expressed the outstanding thought
here controlling:
"The courts are open and free to all who have grievances and
seek remedies therefor, and there should be no restraint upon a suitor,
through fear of liability resulting from failure in his action, which
would keep him from the courts.
"Never was it more necessary than now to preserve unimpaired
this right so vital to the public welfare and so thoroughly a part of our
theory of government. New economic problems increasingly arising in
a constantly, developing nation require solution, and hence lead to
legislation. The statutes thus enacted to meet these problems can
rarely, if ever, be so certain and detailed in expression that their
meaning or extent can be ascertained without judicial determination.
The difficulty which attends their construction is best shown by the
wide variance in the opinions of the courts and the constant resort
to the Supreme Court for authoritative decision. It is thus not strange
that lawyers and laymen may differ as to the meaning of such statutes,
and it would be a negation of the principle and right of free access to
the courts to hold that the submission of rights to judicial deter-
mination involved a dangerous gamble which might subject the loser
to heavy damage."
And in Stringfield v. Hirsch, (1895) 94 Tenn. 425, 29 S. W. 609,
the court said:
"It is not sound public policy to place a penalty on the right
to litigate, that the defeated party must pay the fees of counsel for his
successful opponent in any case, and, especially, since it throws wide
the doors of temptation for the opposing party and his counsel, to
swell the fees to undue proportions."
1031 Sedgvick, Damages, 9th ed., sec. 230.
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pensation is an impracticable ideal. The web of events connects
every wrongful act with too many varied losses and injuries for
the law to protect against them all. The law selects certain risks
of loss and injury and requires the wrongdoers to bear these;
others such as the loss of p. business opportunity by a creditor
when his debtor fails to pay a note, the law finds it more expedient
to pass over. The essential question here, as always in such prob-
lems of delimitation of interests to be protected, is one of exped-
iency or public good.10 The second objection listed above which
points to the difficulties of administering a rule of reinbursement
for counsel fees is a legitimate consideration to be weighed in the
scales of expediency. Undoubtedly, -a jury is a poor tribunal to
which to delegate the delicate and exacting duty Qf scaling down
according to some fairly uniform practice the charge for fees
and expenses. The judge, or in metropolitan courts a referee or
master specializing in this function, as in England, ought to handle
the matter. It will, as in England, add to the time and expense
of the judicial process. However, the recovery of every element
of compensation requires time and expense for its administration,
and this must be balanced against the considerations making for
its allowance. Is the good to be gained by allowing it sufficient
to outweigh the trouble and expense?
The third and fourth objections furnish the most persuasive
support for the existing rule-the desire that parties whose rights
are doubtful and disputed shall feel free to submit them to the
courts. In other words, the desire that proper litigation in gen-
eral shall be encouraged by dividing a part of the hazard rather
than discouraged by threatening the prospective litigant with the
entire cost to both sides of a contemplated contest if he shall lose.
Certainly, it may be supposed that in England a party may hesitate
longer to bring a doubtful suit or interpose a doubtful defense
when the possibility of paying not only his own but his adversary's
lawyers' fees stares him in the face. He might look more favor-
ably upon compromise, arbitration, or even surrender.10 5
The present rule in this country, however, grew up under
frontier conditions when court week was the dramatic spectacle
of the country-side, and where everyone, except the unfortunate
litigants themselves, looked upon the battles of the court room as
10 Compare Green, Proximate Cause, ch. 1, sec. 2, Is the Interest
Protected? and sec. 3, The Limits of Protection.
'
05See Prof. Goodhart's description of how the English practice
works, in his article, Costs, (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 849, 876.'
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by no means wholly undesirable. "Fair play" demanded a cleared
circle and no interference when two inflamed citizens exchanged
blows upon the courthouse square. Fines for first fighting were
few; fights were many. "Fair play," in the court room, seemed
to demand that no unnecessary burdens be heaped on the loser.0 0
Otherwise, the risk might be too heavy for litigants to bear.
The problem of the court-house to-day has become one of
congestion instead of scarcity in the transition from frontier to
the crowded city-civilization of the twentieth century. There seem
to be strong.a priori reasons for believing that a rule which made
the loser bear a greater part of his adversary's expenses of suit
would encourage compromises and diminish litigation, °T but con-
fident conclusions about the matter must await further research.
A preliminary survey and comparison of the practices which ob-
tain in all the principal foreign countries in this respect might
shed some light upon the question.0 8 The problem of apportion-
106"The parties in these cases should be encouraged to appeal to
the court on equal terms. The defendant should not be punished -by
being compelled to pay not only his own counsel but such as the
plaintiff may please to select to advocate his claims against the de-
fendant, but each should be left to conduct his own case, and in his
own way, and at his own expense beyond what the statute allows
in a bill of costs to the prevailing party," St. Peter's Church v. Beach,
(1857) 26 Conn. 355, 366, 367.
1071n the first report of the judicial council of Massachusetts a
change in the system of costs was recommended, and the Council
said:
"There is more litigation in Massachusetts than there ought to be.
For the population there is more than twice as much as there is in
England and Wales. The reason for the difference between the two
jurisdictions is to be found, to a large extent, at any rate, in the
matter of costs.
"In England the costs which the unsuccessful party has to pay
consist (in substance) in the expense he has wrongfully made the
other party incur; in other words, the unsuccessful party in England
has to pay his opponent's lawyer's bill as well as his own. The possi-
bility of having to pay the lawyer's bills of both parties to the action
makes a plaintiff think twice before he sues out a writ and a defend-
ant think twice before he defends an action which ought not to be
defended, and that is a direct deterrent on the number of cases put
or kept in suit.
"In Massachusetts costs are nominal. Where costs are nominal
the plaintiff may win, but not to the full extent of his damage, while
the defendant is sure to be a loser to some extent, for if he is success-
ful in the action he has to pay his own lawyer's bill. This is a direct
incentive to litigation.
"The Council is of opinion that the adoption of the principle of
more substantial costs would tend to diminish the amount of litigation
in Massachusetts, and they know of nothing else which can be done
which can so effectively bring that about," (1925) 11 Mass. L. Q.
63.
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ing between victor and loser the expense of litigation is an im-
portant one and illustrates the difficulty of determining whether a
particular procedural rule operates beneficially or hurtfully. A
study in England of how far prospective litigants are influenced
in suing or withholding action by the fear of having counsel fees
assessed, a similiar study of the effect of the New Jersey equity
rule allowing counsel fees,0 9 and experimentation by some state
by adopting the English practice-one or all of these may be es-
sential before we can declare with any assurance that a change
would actually lessen the flow of lawsuits. On the whole, how-
ever, a practice which compensates with fair completeness one who
has been forced to sue or defend to vindicate his rights, for ex-
penses of the suit or defense, seems most harmonious with the
standards which allow compensation generally for expense to
which one party by his wrong exposes another, seems most adapted
to satisfy the reasonable expectations of men, and appears most
likely to lessen litigation.
10SA cursory investigation indicates that wide diversity in the
practice would be revealed. The Roman procedure seems to have em-
powered the judge under some circumstances to assess one party's
"extra-judicial" costs, such as counsel fees, against the other party.
Engelmann, A History of Continental Civil Procedure, 403. Germany
retains this practice, Hubbell, Legal Directory, (1929) 1433, as does
Czechoslovakia, see Martindale's American Law Directory (1930),
supplement of foreign laws. Seemingly, France and Japan do not
award extra-judicial costs, Hubbell, Legal Directory, 1420, 1450.
109See supra, note 23.
